I used Boeing in another class before, so I already know a few things about them.
For my final research paper I want to figure out if Boeing's safety program actually works, or if it is mostly paperwork covering the same gaps that got them in trouble with the MAX crashes and the door plug on Alaska 1282. The organization I am assessing is Boeing Commercial Airplanes, specifically how they structure and monitor safety through SMS.
Boeing is huge. Over 140,000 employees across commercial aircraft, defense, and space. Their safety program uses the FAA's four pillar framework: Safety Policy, Safety Risk Management, Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion (Federal Aviation Administration, 2024). Their website says all the right things. Safety first. Transparency. Protecting the flying public (Boeing, n.d.). But after the FAA grounded the MAX 9 fleet and the Department of Justice started breathing down their necks, those words hit different. Every company says they care about safety. The question is whether the system catches problems before they leave the factory.
That is where assessment comes in. The FAA describes SMS as a formal top down organization wide approach to managing safety risk (Federal Aviation Administration, 2024). Stroeve, Smeltink, and Kirwan (2022) hit the nail on the head. SMS is often seen as bureaucratic and separate from actual operations. Too focused on catching people breaking rules instead of supporting real safety where the work happens. That is the trap I worry Boeing fell into. When your SMS becomes a compliance exercise you get missing bolts and undocumented removals.
I have seen that gap on the flight line. Management thinks a procedure works because it is in the manual. Ten hours into a shift when the jet needs to launch, that procedure might get skipped. Assessment forces you to look at actual behavior instead of intended behavior. For Boeing that means asking whether their quality inspections catch missing bolts and production errors, or if those things still slip through like they did with Alaska 1282. Adjekum (2016) found that SMS needs both policy implementation and process engagement to actually work.
Another reason assessment matters is the numbers. Johnson and Avers (2012) showed that one maintenance organization spent $205,000 on fatigue training and got a 312 percent ROI over six quarters with nearly 30 percent less aircraft damage. When you can show leadership that safety spending pays for itself, safety stops being the first thing cut. At Boeing's scale even a small improvement means millions saved and lives protected.
Fancy safety charts do not mean much when a door plug blows out at sixteen thousand feet.
References
Adjekum, D. K. (2016). An evaluation of the relationships between safety management system initiatives, transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety behavior, and safety-related events mediated by safety motivation in collegiate aviation [Doctoral dissertation, University of North Dakota]. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing. https://www.proquest.com/dissertations-theses/evaluation-relationships-between-safety/docview/1862014153/se-2?accountid=27203
Boeing. (n.d.). Safety. https://www.boeing.com/safety
Federal Aviation Administration. (2024). Safety Management System (SMS). https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms
Johnson, W. B., & Avers, K. (2012). Return on investment tool for assessing safety interventions. Federal Aviation Administration. https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/about/initiatives/maintenance_hf/fatigue/2012-10_return_on_investment_examples.pdf
Stroeve, S., Smeltink, J., & Kirwan, B. (2022). Assessing and advancing safety management in aviation. Safety, 8(2), Article 20. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8020020
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